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Abstract In their paper Nothing but the Truth Andreas Pietz and Umberto Rivieccio
present Exactly True Logic (ETL), an interesting variation upon the four-valued logic
for first-degree entailment FDE that was given by Belnap and Dunn in the 1970s.
Pietz & Rivieccio provide this logic with a Hilbert-style axiomatisation and write
that finding a nice sequent calculus for the logic will presumably not be easy. But
a sequent calculus can be given and in this paper we will show that a calculus for
the Belnap-Dunn logic we have defined earlier can in fact be reused for the purpose
of characterising ETL, provided a small alteration is made—initial assignments of
signs to the sentences of a sequent to be proved must be different from those used for
characterising FDE. While Pietz & Rivieccio define ETL on the language of classical
propositional logic we also study its consequence relation on an extension of this
language that is functionally complete for the underlying four truth values. On this
extension the calculus gets a multiple-tree character—two proof trees may be needed
to establish one proof.
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1 A Signed Sequent Calculus for Exactly True Logic
In Belnap and Dunn’s well-known four-valued semantics for the logic of first-degree
entailment FDE (Belnap [3, 4], Dunn [5]) the classical principles of Bivalence (every
sentence is true or false) and Noncontradiction (no sentence is both true and false)
are given up. This leads to four possible combinations of truth values, as sentences
can now be either true and not false (T), false and not true (F), neither true nor false
(N), or both true and false (B). These four combinations can be thought of as subsets
of the set {1, 0} of classical truth values, so that T can be identified with {1}, F with
{0}, N with ∅, and B with {1, 0}.
How can complex sentences be assigned one of these sets of truth values given the
sets of truth values assigned to their parts? Dunn [5] gives the following very natural
solution.
i. ¬ϕ is true if and only if ϕ is false,
¬ϕ is false if and only if ϕ is true;
ii. ϕ ∧ ψ is true if and only if ϕ is true and ψ is true,
ϕ ∧ ψ is false if and only if ϕ is false or ψ is false;
iii. ϕ ∨ ψ is true if and only if ϕ is true or ψ is true,
ϕ ∨ ψ is false if and only if ϕ is false and ψ is false.
Suppose ϕ has the value T, i.e. ϕ is true and not false. Then Dunn’s condition i. tells
us that ¬ϕ is false and not true, i.e. has the value F. Further reasoning along these
lines leads to the following truth tables.
Definition 1 The following are truth tables for ¬, ∧, and ∨.
A more compact way to characterise the semantics of conjunction and disjunction in
the Belnap-Dunn logic is to say that they correspond to meet and join in the following
lattice, called L4 in [3, 4]. Negation corresponds to a top-bottom swap—leaving the
other two values as they are.
Let us consider the language Lt of classical propositional logic based on {¬,∧,∨}
and define valuations to be functions from the sentences of this language to
{T,F,N,B} that respect the truth tables just given. The entailment relation of FDE
can be defined as follows.




denotes meet in the L4 lattice and ≤t denotes L4’s lattice ordering. This
definition corresponds to the definition in [4]. A second definition, which proceeds
by letting T and B be designated truth values, is as follows, but produces the same
result.
(2)
That these two definitions indeed characterise the same notion can easily be shown
on the basis of the observation that every valuation V comes with a dual V ′ such that,
for all ϕ, V (ϕ) = V ′(ϕ) if V (ϕ) ∈ {T,F}, while V (ϕ) = N iff V ′(ϕ) = B, and, vice
versa, V (ϕ) = B iff V ′(ϕ) = N. Details are left to the reader.
In a recent paper Andreas Pietz and Umberto Rivieccio ([12], henceforth P&R)
remark that it is a curious feature of the Belnap-Dunn logic that B is a designated
value. Prima facie, the authors remark, it seems more plausible to have only T desig-
nated. P&R then investigate the effect of defining entailment in terms of preservation
of T only, while the rest of the four-valued semantics sketched above remains as is.
More formally, the relation is replaced by a relation defined as follows.
(3)
The logic that is obtained in this way is called Exactly True Logic (ETL).
P&R also provide a Hilbert-style axiomatisation of ETL, which they obtain by
adding a single rule (corresponding to disjunctive syllogism) to Font’s [7] Hilbert-
style axiomatisation of FDE. Hence, ETL extends FDE and in particular ETL does,
while FDE does not, validate ex contradictione quodlibet. However, as P&R point
out, although
(4)
it is not the case that
(5)
Regarding this somewhat unusual feature, which they call anti-primeness, P&R
make the following remark.
Presumably, this will not make it easy to find a nice sequent calculus for this
logic. [12, p129]
As the authors further point out [12, p130], in particular sequent calculi that enjoy
cut-elimination and the subformula property qualify as nice.
But in fact an analytic and cut-free sequent calculus that can characterise ETL
already exists, be it that a small modification must be made in order to tailor it to this
logic. In Wintein & Muskens [16] we have given a calculus whose rules (restricted
to the {∧,∨,¬} fragment of the logic considered there) are essentially those of the
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PLt4 calculus presented in Definition 2 below.
1 The calculus is based on four-sided
sequents,2 but instead of writing sequents as 4-tuples 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 of sets of
sentences, we represent them in an equivalent but more convenient way as finite sets
of signed sentences x : ϕ, where x ranges over a set of four signs and ϕ is a sentence
of Lt .
The four signs we will use are 1, 1, 0, and 0. While their role in the sequent
calculus is purely syntactic, they also have an informal interpretation that is obtained
by letting 1 correspond to {T,B}, 1 to {F,N}, 0 to {F,B}, and 0 to {T,N}, i.e. 1 : ϕ
can be read as ‘ϕ is true’ (or, ‘1 is an element of the value of ϕ’), 1 : ϕ as ‘ϕ is not
true’ (‘1 is not an element of the value of ϕ’), 0 : ϕ as ‘ϕ is false’, and 0 : ϕ as ‘ϕ is
not false’.
Definition 2 (PLt4 calculus) All instantiations of the following rule schemes are
sequent rules.
, x : ϕ, y : ϕ (R)
, y : ϕ
, x : ¬ϕ (¬)
if 〈x, y〉 ∈ {〈1, 1〉, 〈0, 0〉} if 〈x, y〉 or 〈y, x〉 ∈ {〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 0〉}
, x : ϕ, x : ψ
, x : ϕ ∧ ψ (∧
1)
, x : ϕ , x : ψ
, x : ϕ ∧ ψ (∧
2)
if x ∈ {1, 0} if x ∈ {1, 0}
, x : ϕ, x : ψ
, x : ϕ ∨ ψ (∨
1)
, x : ϕ , x : ψ
, x : ϕ ∨ ψ (∨
2)
if x ∈ {1, 0} if x ∈ {1, 0}
A derivation, or proof attempt, for a sequent  is a tree of sequents, with  at the
root, such that each sequent on the tree follows from the ones above it by one of the
rules. A proof attempt is a proof tree if it is finite and all its leaves can be obtained
by an application of rule (R). A sequent  is provable if it is at the root of (i.e. is the
end sequent of) a proof tree.
It is worth noticing that there is a tight connection between the rules for connec-
tives presented here and Dunn’s evaluation scheme mentioned above. For example
rule (∧2) corresponds to the rule that ϕ ∧ ψ is false (not true) iff ϕ is false (not
true) or ψ is false (not true). Other rule schemes here can be explained similarly. The
following is an example of a sequent proof obtained using the PLt4 calculus.
1PLt4 stands for ‘4-valued propositional logic for Lt ’. The signs considered in the calculus in [16] are pairs
whose first element is either n (north) or s (south) and whose second element is w (west) or e (east). The
1 sign of the present calculus corresponds to the north-west sign of the calculus in [16] , 0 to south-west,
1 to north-east, and 0 to south-east.
2For the idea of n-sided sequents, see Rousseau [14], where classical (two-sided) sequents 1 	 2 are
generalised to sequents of the form 1 | · · · | n .
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Example 1 For any ϕ and ψ , the sequent {1 : ϕ∧¬ϕ, 0 : ϕ∧¬ϕ, 1 : ψ} is provable:
And here is an example of a (failed) proof attempt. We will use this and the previous
example for an analysis of the anti-primeness of ETL a bit further on.
Example 2 The following is a proof attempt for 1 : p ∧ ¬p, 0 : q ∧ ¬q, 1 : r .
An easy but useful lemma shows that there is a duality between truth and non-falsity
and between falsity and non-truth in this calculus.
Lemma 1 Let  and ′ be Lt sequents that are 10-isomorphisms, i.e.:
1 : ϕ ∈  ⇔ 0 : ϕ ∈ ′ 1 : ϕ ∈  ⇔ 0 : ϕ ∈ ′
0 : ϕ ∈  ⇔ 1 : ϕ ∈ ′ 0 : ϕ ∈  ⇔ 1 : ϕ ∈ ′
Then  is provable if and only if ′ is provable.
Proof By an inspection of the sequent rules.
Let us turn to the connection between the calculus PLt4 and the semantics of the
logic. The following definition makes the informal interpretation of the four signs
given above explicit by connecting sequents and the valuations refuting them.
Definition 3 Let V be a valuation and let  be a sequent. V refutes  if, for all ϕ,
1 : ϕ ∈  ⇒ 1 ∈ V (ϕ) 1 : ϕ ∈  ⇒ 1 /∈ V (ϕ)
0 : ϕ ∈  ⇒ 0 ∈ V (ϕ) 0 : ϕ ∈  ⇒ 0 /∈ V (ϕ).
A signed sequent is refutable if some valuation refutes it; irrefutable if none does.
The next observation fleshes out the tight connection between the PLt4 calculus
and the Belnap-Dunn truth conditions a bit further.
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Lemma 2 For every instantiation of a rule scheme, the bottom sequent is refuted by
a valuation V iff one of the top sequents is refuted by V . In case of the (R) rule,
which has no top sequents, this boils down to the statement that its bottom sequent is
irrefutable.
Proof By inspection of each of the rule schemes.
This brings us to the completeness theorem. It already follows from the results in
[10] and [16], but for the convenience of the reader we provide a short direct proof
here.
Theorem 1 (Soundness, Completeness) A sequent is provable iff it is irrefutable.
Proof The ⇒ direction follows easily by an induction on proof depth plus the obser-
vation in Lemma 2. For the ⇐ direction, assume that  is not provable. We use
induction on the total number n of connectives occurring in . If n = 0,  is a set
of signed propositional constants that is not a conclusion of the (R) rule. This means
that  does not contain a pair 1 : α, 1 : α, or a pair 0 : α, 0 : α. The valuation V
such that 1 ∈ V (α) ⇔ 1 : α ∈  and 0 ∈ V (α) ⇔ 0 : α ∈ , for all propositional
constants α, refutes .
If n > 0,  can be written as a sequent , θ , where θ is some signed sentence
containing at least one connective and θ /∈ . Inspection of the rules shows that in
this case  follows from a sequent 1 or from a pair of sequents 1 and 2, each
containing fewer than n connectives. One of these top sequents must be unprovable
and hence, by induction, refuted by some valuation V . Lemma 2 gives that  is
refuted by the same V . We conclude that a sequent is refutable if it is unprovable.
Remark 1 The completeness part of this proof in fact interprets the calculus as a
model search procedure. For example, in order to refute
1 : p ∧ ¬p, 0 : q ∧ ¬q, 1 : r,
build a proof attempt as in Example 2, inspect the topmost sequent, and use it to find
a V with V (p) = B, V (q) = N, and V (r) = N.
The PLt4 calculus can be used to give proof-theoretic characterisations of more
than one logic. For example, a syntactic consequence relation for FDE can be defined
as follows.
(6)
Since it is easy to see that iff {1 : γ | γ ∈ } ∪ {1 : ϕ} is irrefutable, it
follows from Theorem 1 that the syntactic and semantic entailment relations of FDE
correspond.
Proposition 1
A Gentzen Calculus for Nothing but the Truth 457
But other logics are characterisable as well. The calculus also provides a syntactic
characterisation of ETL if initial assignments of signs to formulas are altered, as in
the following definition.
(7)
At first blush it may seem that a stronger definiens is needed here, since irrefutability
of {1 : γ | γ ∈ } ∪ {0 : γ | γ ∈ } ∪ {1 : ϕ} only seems to correspond to the
impossibility of all γ ∈  getting the value T while the value of ϕ is F or N (and thus
not excluding ϕ having the value B), but it follows from Lemma 1 and the definition
in Eq. 7 that the following equivalence holds.
(8)
Completeness for ETL easily follows from Eqs. 7, 8 and Theorem 1.
Proposition 2
Let us analyse the anti-primeness of the logic ETL a bit further. In view of Example
1, we have that . Note that the proof in Example 1 rests on having
signed sentences of the forms 1 : ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ and 0 : ϕ ∧ ¬ϕ in a single sequent. In a
proof attempt for
this feature gets lost in some branches of the attempted proof. More in particular,
starting with the end sequent
1 : (p ∧ ¬p) ∨ (q ∧ ¬q), 0 : (p ∧ ¬p) ∨ (q ∧ ¬q), 1 : r,
three applications of (∨2) bring us to the following sequents that must all be proven.
1 : p ∧ ¬p, 0 : p ∧ ¬p, 1 : r
1 : p ∧ ¬p, 0 : q ∧ ¬q, 1 : r
1 : q ∧ ¬q, 0 : p ∧ ¬p, 1 : r
1 : q ∧ ¬q, 0 : q ∧ ¬q, 1 : r
The first and the last of these are provable as in Example 1, but an attempt to prove
the second (or third) sequent leads to failure, as Example 2 shows, and the refuting
valuation V defined by V (p) = B, V (q) = N, and V (r) = N also refutes the end
sequent.
A natural first reaction to the anti-primeness of ETL might be to assume that the
feature must be due to the fact that disjunction has an unusual meaning in the logic. In
particular it may seem that ETL must assign a different meaning to ∨ than FDE does,
as the latter is not anti-prime. We do not think that this is a correct analysis of the phe-
nomenon, however. What is it that determines the meaning of a logical connective?
Two traditional answers suggest themselves: truth conditions and inferential rules.
But the truth conditions of ∨ are the same in the two logics and correspond to join in
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the L4 lattice, while the inferential rules are likewise the same in our analysis—they
are given by the (∨1) and (∨2) rules.
The only point where ETL and FDE differ is in their definitions of entailment3—
FDE takes T and B as designated values, while ETL uses only T. It is this feature, we
like to argue, that is solely responsible for the difference in behaviour.4
2 Adding Expressivity
ETL was defined in terms of a consequence relation on the language of classical
propositional logic Lt , but as is well known this language cannot express all truth
functions on 4 := {T,B,N,F}. In this section we will consider extensions of ETL to
more expressive languages, one containing an extra implication and one that is func-
tionally complete. We will also consider some extensions of FDE to the functionally
complete language and compare the logics thus defined.
2.1 Adding an Appropriate Implication Connective
A first consequence of the lack of expressive power provided by {¬, ∧, ∨} is that
there are no ETL tautologies and hence that no implication connective is definable in
Lt that allows ETL to enjoy a deduction theorem. Restricted as it is to Lt , ETL does
not have what Arieli and Avron [1] call an appropriate implication connective, i.e. a
connective → that corresponds to ETL entailment in the following sense.
(9)
It should be noted though, that the right-to-left direction of Eq. 9—expressing a reso-
lution theorem—is satisfied for the connective, where ϕ  ψ := ¬ϕ∨ψ . Indeed,
this follows immediately from the observation that α, , i.e. that modus
ponens is valid in ETL.5
The fact that Lt does not allow for an appropriate implication connective provides
a motivation6 to consider an extension of Lt . Let L
⊃
t be the result of extending Lt
with the connective ⊃, whose semantics is given by the following truth table.
Definition 4 The following is the truth table for ⊃.
3If entailment is understood syntactically, the difference is reflected by the initial assignments of signs to
the premisses and conclusion of an argument whose validity is under consideration.
4In a similar vein, Hjortland [8] argues that Strong Kleene Logic and the Logic of Paradox agree on the
meaning of the logical connectives but disagree on the meaning of logical consequence.
5In contrast, FDE does not have a resolution theorem (nor a deduction theorem) and there is no Lt defin-
able connective that allows FDE to enjoy modus ponens. In particular, modus ponens expressed in terms
of  is equivalent to disjunctive syllogism, which is invalid in FDE (but valid in ETL).
6In the context of FDE, an entirely similar motivation leads Arieli and Avron [1] to consider an extension
of Lt with an appropriate implication connective. In fact, the semantic definition of our ⊃ as given in
Definition 4 can be considered to be the ETL counterpart of the connective considered by Arieli and Avron.
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Thus, ϕ ⊃ ψ takes the value of ψ whenever ϕ is T, and takes value T otherwise.
An L ⊃t valuation is a function from the sentences of L ⊃t to 4 that respects the truth
tables given in Definitions 6 and 4. Let us write V⊃ for the set of all L ⊃t valuations.
By quantifying over V⊃, the ETL consequence relation for Lt can be extended to one
for L⊃.
(10)
That the connective ⊃ indeed is an appropriate implication connective for and
satisfies modus ponens is attested by the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The following relations hold.
Proof By inspection.
Let us also give a syntactic characterisation of this entailment relation. It can be
done by first adding rules for ⊃ to the signed sequent calculus.
Definition 5 (PL⊃4 calculus) All instantiations of the rule schemes given in Defini-
tion 2 are PL⊃4 sequent rules. In addition, all instantiations of the following two rule
schemes are PL⊃4 sequent rules.
, 1 : ϕ, 0 : ϕ, x : ψ
, x : ϕ ⊃ ψ (⊃
1)
, 0 : ϕ , 1 : ϕ , x : ψ
, x : ϕ ⊃ ψ (⊃
2)
if x ∈ {1, 0} if x ∈ {1, 0}
The definitions of derivation, proof tree, and provability of a signed sequent given in
Definition 2 are extended in the obvious way.
Inspection of these rule schemes shows that Lemma 2 can in fact be extended to
them and that the completeness theorem (Theorem 1) therefore also extends to the
present more expressive setting. Moreover, it is easy to verify that Lemma 1 continues
to hold, so that the entailment relation for the richer logic can be defined as follows.
(11)
And again Theorem 1 leads to completeness.
Proposition 4 .
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2.2 A Functionally Complete Extension
Adding ⊃ to ETL turned out to be plain sailing. What about other connectives?
ETL also lacks a strong negation connective and a connective expressing that two
sentences are logically equivalent, so one may consider adding those and other oper-
ators as well. We will add all possible operators in one fell swoop and define a
functionally complete extension Lti (the t is for ‘truth’, the i for ‘information’)
of Lt , studying ETL entailment on it. This mirrors a move in the literature, where
FDE consequence has been studied on functionally complete extensions of Lt (see
e.g. Muskens [9, 10], Arieli and Avron [2], Ruet [15], Pynko [13], or Omori and
Sano [11]).
The language Lti we consider is defined by the following BNF.
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | −ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ⊗ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ϕ ⊕ ϕ
The truth tables of the connectives −, ⊗ and ⊕ introduced here are given by the
following definition.
Definition 6 The following are truth tables for the Lti connectives −, ⊗ and ⊕.
An Lti valuation is a function from the sentences of Lti to 4 that respects the above
truth tables and those of ¬,∧ and ∨ as given by Definition 1. From this point on V
will range over Lti valuations.
That {∧,∨,¬,⊗,⊕,−} is indeed functionally complete with respect to all truth
functions over 4 is shown in Muskens [9].7 One example of a connective that can be
defined in Lti is ⊃, whose truth table was given by definition 4.
ϕ ⊃ ψ := ¬(ϕ ∧ −ϕ) ∨ ψ
Clearly there are several sets of connectives that are functionally complete for 4,
but the ones considered here form a natural collection from an algebraic point of
view. While ∧ and ∨ correspond to meet and join in the (logical) lattice L4, ⊗
and ⊕ correspond to meet and join in the following ‘approximation of informa-
tion’ lattice A4. The lattice A4 also plays a fundamental role in Belnap-Dunn logic
(cf. [3, 4]).
7However, the set is not a minimal functionally complete set of connectives of 4 as it has proper subsets
that can also express all the truth functions over 4. The set of connectives {∧,¬,⊗,−} is minimal in this
sense though, as can easily be shown.
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Furthermore, while ¬ corresponds to a top-bottom swap in L4, − corresponds to a
top-bottom swap in A4. Thus, ⊗, ⊕ and − are dual to ∧, ∨ and ¬ in a sense that is
aptly explained by referring to the lattices L4, associated with the “truth order on 4”
and A4, associated with the “information order on 4”.
Let us have a look at extensions of the FDE relation of entailment before we
study ETL entailment on the extended language. The algebraic structure FOU R− :=
〈4,∧,∨,¬,⊗,⊕,−〉8 is an example of what Fitting [6] calls a bilattice with confla-
tion (where − is a conflation operator) and the pair 〈FOU R−, {T,B}〉 is an example
of what Arieli and Avron [1] call an ultralogical bilattice. Arieli and Avron observe
that the consequence relation for Lti that is based on the class of all ultralogical
bilattices is equivalent to the following consequence relation that is only based on the
ultralogical bilattice 〈FOU R−, {T,B}〉.9
(12)
In view of Eq. 2 above this notion of entailment, based on preservation of truth, is
clearly an extension of . But it should be pointed out that the equivalence between
the right hand sides of Eqs. 1 and 2 no longer holds after our move to Lti . The
entailment relation that is defined as follows (with ≤t still the ordering in the L4
lattice) is also an extension of the FDE entailment relation, but it is distinct from the
one defined in Eq. 12.
(13)
That the two relations are no longer coextensional in the new setting is because the
elements of 4 have become definable. Let p be some arbitrary propositional constant
and define t as ¬p ∨ −p and b as −(¬p ⊗ −p). It is easily seen that, for each V ,
V (t) = T and V (b) = B. So we have that , while is clearly not the case.
There is an obvious dual to the entailment relation given in Eq. 12 that is based on
the preservation of non-falsity.
(14)
8We use the same notation for connectives of Lti and the truth functions that they denote here, trusting
that this does not cause any confusion.
9Wherever we superscript a syntactic or semantic consequence relation with ti , the relation is to be
understood as defined between sets of sentences and sentences of Lti .
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This relation is distinct from each of the relations defined in Eqs. 12 and 13, as the
reader can easily verify. But the following holds.
(15)
Proof Note that a ≤t b iff a ∈ {T,B} ⇒ b ∈ {T,B} and a ∈ {T,N} ⇒ b ∈ {T,N}
both hold.
The expressibility of B and N in Lti depends on the presence of ⊗ or ⊕ and
it are these connectives that make and come apart. The two relations are
coextensional on the {¬,∧,∨,−} fragment of Lti .
Proposition 5 Let ϕ be a sentence of Lti that only contains the connectives ∧, ∨, ¬
and − and let  be a set of such sentences. Then .
Proof For any valuation V , let V ′ be the unique valuation such that, for all proposi-
tional constants p, V ′(p) = V (−p) (V ′ is the valuation we have earlier called the
dual of V ). By inspection of the truth tables it is easily seen that, for any ϕ in the
{¬,∧,∨,−} fragment of the language, V ′(ϕ) = V (−ϕ). This means that if V is a
counterexample to , V ′ is a counterexample to and vice versa.
So which of the three entailment relations for extended FDE considered above is
the ‘right’ one? Our vote goes to for reasons of symmetry and because it is based
on the L4 lattice that is so central to the logic. A definition based on L4 is also the
one explicitly endorsed by Belnap [3, 4] for standard FDE.10 (See also [10, 16]).
Let us consider ETL again. Only one option presents itself when extending its
entailment relation to the functionally complete language—the one in line with the
definitions in Eqs. 3 and 10.
(16)
Comparing this relation with the previous ones, we see that it includes but not the
other two.
Proposition 6 The following relations hold.
10See, e.g., [4, p. 15] while on page 43 of [3] we find:
But I agree with the spirit of a remark of Dunn’s, which suggests that the False really is on all
fours with the True, so that it is profoundly natural to state our account of “valid” or “acceptable”
inference in a way which is neutral with respect to the two.
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Proof The first claim follows from an inspection of the definitions. The second from
the observation that but not . The third from the fact that but not
, where n is defined as −b.
Readers familiar with Arieli and Avron [1] will be interested to verify that the
pair 〈FOU R−, {T}〉, which induces , is not an ultralogical bilattice (the reason
being that the constraint a ∨ b ∈ {T} ⇐⇒ a ∈ {T} or b ∈ {T} is violated). This
means that Arieli and Avron’s sequent calculus for ‘ultralogical bilattice logic’ does
not characterise .
All consequence relations discussed until now can be captured syntactically by the
PL4 calculus below, which is (a notational variant of) the propositional part of the
calculus considered in [16]. Sequents are redefined in the obvious way—as sets of
pairs x : ϕ, where x is a sign and ϕ now is an Lti sentence.
Definition 7 (PL4 calculus) All instantiations of the rule schemes (R), (¬),
(∧1), (∧2), (∨1) and (∨2) of Definition 2 are PL4 sequent rules. In addition, all
instantiations of the following five rule schemes are PL4 sequent rules.
, y : ϕ
, x : −ϕ (−)
if 〈x, y〉 or 〈y, x〉 ∈ {〈1, 0〉, 〈1, 0〉}
, x : ϕ, x : ψ
, x : ϕ ⊗ ψ (⊗
1)
, x : ϕ , x : ψ
, x : ϕ ⊗ ψ (⊗
2)
if x ∈ {1, 0} if x ∈ {1, 0}
, x : ϕ, x : ψ
, x : ϕ ⊕ ψ (⊕
1)
, x : ϕ , x : ψ
, x : ϕ ⊕ ψ (⊕
2)
if x ∈ {1, 0} if x ∈ {1, 0}
The definitions of derivation, proof tree, and provability of a signed sequent given in
Definition 2 are extended in the obvious way again.
The good news at this point is that Theorem 1 generalises to the present setting.
If Definition 3 is generalised in the obvious way, inspection of the additional rule
schemes presented above will tell that Lemma 2 still goes through, so that the proof
of Theorem 1 can remain unchanged.
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Let us define the following syntactic relations.
These relations indeed characterise the entailment relations they were meant to.
Proposition 7 , , .
Proof From Theorem 1, the equivalence in Eq. 15, and the relevant definitions.
Note that showing that will now in general require two proof trees, one for
preservation of truth, the other for preservation of non-falsity. For ETL it will also
be the case that two proof trees are required, as Lemma 1 cannot be extended to a
language containing ⊗ or ⊕. The following definition gives the right notion.
And again we have:
Proposition 8
Proof Using Theorem 1.
3 Conclusion
We have given a characterisation of Pietz and Rivieccio’s [12] Exactly True Logic
by means of (a notational variant of a fragment of) the analytic and cut-free signed
sequent calculus presented in [16]. This calculus was originally devised in order to
characterise a generalisation of the logic of first-degree entailment in a functionally
complete language. That it can also be used for ETL rests on the fact that there is
some leeway in mapping unsigned sequents to the signed sequents that need to be
proved. One signed calculus can therefore model more than one logic.
The anti-primeness of ETL, the fact that, as Pietz and Rivieccio observe, Eq. 5
does not hold while Eq. 4 does, will only be a stumbling-block for characterising the
logic if it is insisted upon that the calculus for doing that is a traditionally two-sided
(or two-signed) one. Our proofs for ETL are based upon a four-signed calculus in
which premises are marked with two distinct signs. In this set-up all mystery about
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why and have proofs while Eq. 5 leads to a failed proof
attempt and hence to refutability has disappeared.
We have also extended ETL to a functionally complete language and have com-
pared it with FDE in this setting. Proving ETL consequence in the presence of the
‘consensus’ operator ⊗, or its ‘gullibility’ dual ⊕, in general requires the devel-
opment of two proof trees in our system, as does proving FDE entailment in this
context.
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